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1.1  Introduction and Summary 
The prolonged appreciation of  the dollar that ended in early  1985 
began  in  the  spring of  1981. The data for the real  effective foreign 
exchange value of the dollar (e)  and the real long-term interest rate (r) 
are shown in figures 1.3 and 1.7 below. From the fourth quarter of 1980 
to the fourth quarter of 1981, the real long-term interest rate rose from 
1.3 to 8.3% and the dollar appreciated by 13% in real effective terms. 
Since then, long-term real interest rates have remained in the range of 
5-10%.  The dollar appreciated further in a series of steps, reaching a 
peak in early  1985 with a real appreciation of about 55%  relative to 
1980. It has declined by about 25% since then (as of December 1986), 
but remains 23%  above its  1980 level. In this paper I lay out the ar- 
gument that the rise in real interest rates and the dollar were largely 
due to the budget program that was announced in March 1981 and was 
subsequently executed. In particular, the shift in the high-employment- 
or “structural,”  as the responsible parties have taken to calling it- 
deficit by some $200 billion requires an increase in real interest rates 
and a real appreciation to generate the sum of excess domestic saving 
and a current account deficit to finance it. The argument is a straight- 
forward extension of the idea of  “crowding out” at full employment 
to an open economy. The decline in real interest rates and the dollar 
since mid-1985 has coincided with the passage of the Gramm-Rudman- 
Hollings (GRH) Act, which predicts with perhaps limited credibility 
the closure of the structural deficit. The evidence, it will turn out, is 
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clear. The expansionary shift in  the structural deficit pushed real in- 
terest rates and the dollar up; closing the deficit will bring them down. 
The current situation of mid-1987, with a continuing structural deficit 
estimated by the Congressional Budget Office to be $175 billion, or 4% 
of GNP, is not sustainable, however. It is a “temporary equilibrium,” 
to use the jargon  of  macroeconomic dynamics.  If  the deficit is not 
eliminated, eventually international investors will begin to resist further 
absorption of dollars into their portfolios, so U.S. interest rates would 
have to rise again, and the dollar will have to depreciate. This process 
may have begun as early as mid-1985. It will continue until the current 
account is back in approximate balance, and the entire load of deficit 
financing is  shifted to excess U.S. saving. This paper  describes the 
links from shifts in the structural deficit to real interest rates and the 
real  exchange rate, and the dynamic mechanism  that  will  bring the 
dollar back down again. 
The present paper draws heavily on Branson, Fraga, and Johnson 
(1986) for analysis of  the effects of  the  1981  budget  program.  The 
technical details of the analysis are given there; here I simply lay out 
the logic and the implications for policy. Sections  1.2 and 1.3 of the 
paper present the “fundamentals”  framework of the analysis. These 
sections draw on the discussion in Branson (1985a). The framework is 
fundamental in the sense that it emphasizes the variables, such as the 
high-employment deficit or the oil price, that the market should look 
to when it is forming expectations about movements in interest rates 
or the exchange rate. The focus is on real interest rates and the real 
(effective) exchange rate; these are the variables whose movements 
have been  surprising. The argument that the shift in the budget  can 
explain the rise in real interest rates and the dollar is presented in these 
two sections. 
The role of expectations and the timing of the jump in interest rates 
and the dollar is discussed in section 1.4. The Economic Recovery Tax 
Act of  1981 provided a credible announcement of a future expansion 
in  the high-employment budget deficit. The financial markets reacted 
by raising interest rates and the dollar well in advance of the actual 
fiscal  shift, contributing to the recession  of  1981-82.  The Gramm- 
Rudman-Hollings legislation of 1985 announced a future contraction of 
the deficit. The markets reacted with a reduction of real interest rates 
and the dollar, again well in advance of the actual fiscal shift. 
Finally, in  section  1.5, I  summarize recent econometric evidence, 
presented by  Martin Feldstein (1986), that the shift in  the structural 
budget deficit in the United States indeed explains the real appreciation 
of the dollar, leaving little room for the alternative explanations. Feld- 
stein’s econometrics for the exchange rate between the dollar and the 11  Sources of  Misalignment in the 1980s 
German deutsche mark show insignificant effects of the German budget 
position, so I will stick with a simple model of the U.S. economy here. 
1.2  Short-Run Equilibrium in a Fundamentals Framework 
A good start for my  discussion of the causes of  the movements of 
the dollar in the 1980s is exposition of a framework that describes the 
determination of movements in real interest rates and the real exchange 
rate. The focus is on real interest rates, because these have been the 
source of surprise and concern. If  nominal interest rates had simply 
followed the path of expected or realized inflation and the exchange 
rate had followed the path of relative prices, the world would be per- 
ceived to be  in  order. It is the movement  of  interest rates and the 
exchange rate relative to the price path that is of interest here. So I 
begin by taking the actual and expected path of prices as given, perhaps 
determined by monetary policy, and I focus on real interest rates and 
the real exchange rate. 
In this section I develop a framework that integrates goods markets 
and asset markets to describe simultaneous determination of the in- 
terest rate and the exchange rate. It is “short run” in the sense that I 
take existing stock of assets as given. Movement in these stocks will 
provide the dynamics of  section  1.3. It is a fundamentals framework 
because it focuses on the underlying macroeconomic determinants of 
movements in rates, about which the market will form expectations. 
The latter are discussed in section 1.4.  The framework is useful because 
it permits us to distinguish between external events such as shifts in 
the budget position (the deficit), shifts in international asset demands 
(the “safe haven effect”), and changes in tax law or financial regulation 
by analyzing their differing implications for movements in the interest 
rate and the exchange rate. It also permits me to analyze the effects 
of exogenous shifts in  the current account balance due to savings in 
the oil price on exchange rates and interest rates. This will be useful 
in discussing the effect of the fall in the oil price on the yen after mid- 
1985. I begin with the national income, or flow-of-funds, identity that 
constrains flows in  the economy, then turn to the asset-market equi- 
librium that constrains rates of return, and finally bring the two together 
in figure 1.1. 
1.2.1 
The national income identity that constrains flows in  the economy 
isgenerally writtenas Y = C  + I + G + X  =  C  + S  + T, withthe 
usual meanings of the symbols, as summarized in table 1.1. Note here 
that for simplicity X  stands for net exports of goods and services, the 
Flow Equilibrium: The National Income Identity 12  William H. Branson 
Table 1.1  Definitions of Symbols 
National Income Flows (all in real terms) 
Y  = GNP 





T  = Tax revenue 
NFI = Net foreign investment by the United States 
NFE=  Net foreign borrowing  = -  NFI 
Prices and Stocks 
r  = Real domestic interest rate 
i  = Nominal domestic interest rate 
r*  = Real foreign interest rate 
i’  = Nominal foreign interest rate 
e  = Real effective exchange rate (units of foreign exchange per dollar); an increase 
t?  = Expected rate of change of e 
= Expected rate of inflation 
p  = Risk premium on dollar-denominated bonds 
E  = Outstanding stock of government debt 
= Gross private domestic investment 
= Government purchases of goods and services 
= Net exports of goods and services, or the current account balance 
= Gross private domestic saving 
in e is an appreciation of the dollar 
current account balance. All flows are in real terms. We  can subtract 
consumer expenditure C from both sides of the right-hand equality and 
do some rearranging to obtain a useful version  of the flow-of-funds 
identity: 
(1)  G - T=  (S -  I) -  X. 
In terms of national income and product flows, equation (1) says the 
total (federal, state, and local) government deficit must equal the sum 
of the excess of domestic private saving over investment less net exports. 
Let us now think of equation (1)  as holding at a standardized high- 
employment level of output, in order to exclude cyclical effects from 
the discussion. This allows us to focus on shifts in the budget at a given 
level of  income. A deficit or surplus in this high-employment budget 
has come to be called the “structural”  deficit in the 1980s. The OECD 
also calls it the “cyclically-adjusted’’  budget deficit. From here on I 
will refer to it as the “structural budget.” 
If  we take a shift in this structural deficit (G - T)  as external, or 
exogenous to the economy, equation (1) emphasizes that this shift re- 
quires some endogenous adjustment to excess private saving (S -  I) 
and the current account X to balance the flows in income and product. 
In particular, if (G - T)  is increased by $200 billion, roughly the actual 13  Sources of Misalignment in the 1980s 
increase in the structural deficit after 1981, a combination of an increase 
in S - I and a decrease in X that also totals $200 billion is required. 
Standard macroeconomic theory  tells  us that for a given level of 
income, (S - I)  depends positively on the real interest rate r, and X 
depends negatively on the real exchange rate e (units of foreign ex- 
change per dollar, adjusted for relative price levels).' So the endogenous 
adjustments that would increase S -  Z  and reduce X  are an increase 
in r and in e. Some combination of these changes would restore balance 
in equation (l), given an increase in G - T. 
We  can relate this national income view of the short-run adjustment 
mechanism to the more popular story involving foreign borrowing and 
capital flows by noting that net exports X  is also net national foreign 
investment from the balance of payments identity. Since national net 
foreign investment is minus national net foreign borrowing (NFB),  so 
that X  = NFZ  =  -NFB,  the flow-of-funds equation (1) can also be 
written as 
(2)  (G - T) = (S -  I) -  NFZ  = (S -  Z) + NFB. 
This form of the identity emphasizes that an increase in the deficit must 
be  financed  either by  an increase  in  excess domestic  saving or an 
increase in net foreign borrowing (decrease in net foreign investment). 
One way to interpret the adjustment mechanism is that the shift in the 
deficit raises U.S. interest rates, increasing S - I. The high rates at- 
tract foreign capital or lead to a reduction  in U.S.  lending abroad, 
appreciating the dollar, that is, raising e. This process continues, with 
r and e increasing, until the increase in S - I and the decrease in X 
add up to the originating shift in the deficit. 
The actual movements in the government deficit, net domestic saving 
(S - I),  and net foreign borrowing, and the associated movements in 
the real  long-term  rate  r  and  the  real  exchange rate e  (indexed  to 
1985  = 100) are shown in table 1.2. The combined federal, state, and 
local deficit was roughly zero at the beginning of 1981. It expanded to 
a peak of $167 billion in the bottom of the recession in the fourth quarter 
of  1982 and then shrank in  the recovery.  But the shift in the federal 
budget position left the total government deficit at $155 billion at the 
end of  1985, after  three  years  of  recovery.  Initially  the deficit was 
financed mainly by net domestic saving, which also peaked at the bot- 
tom of the recession. But since 1982 the fraction financed by net foreign 
borrowing has risen; by the end of  1985 nearly all of the government 
deficit was financed by foreign borrowing. 
The movements in the real interest rate and the real exchange rate 
roughly reflect this pattern of financing. The real interest rate jumped 
from around 2.0% to over 8%  in  1981, fell during the recession, and 
rose in the recovery, staying in the 5-10%  range since mid-1983. The 14  William H. Branson 
Table 1.2  Savings and Investment Flows,  Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates, 
United States, 19791-1986:Il (Billions of Dollars Unless Otherwise 
Specified) 
Real 
Interest  Real 
Net  Excess  Total  Budget  20-Year  Rate 
Foreign  Domestic  Budget  Surplus  Treasury  Index 
Federal  Rate for  Exchange 











1981  :Ill 
















1985:  IV 
19863 
1986:II 
5.8  -  15.0 
-1.9  -  20.6 
4.5  -3.6 
-  2.6  -1.1 
0.1  12.3 
12.1  54.2 
27.9  76.5 
6.7  42.2 
16.3  30.9 
4.9  19.7 
5.5  31.7 
11.2  74.2 
7.3  83.3 
16.5  94.3 
-  12.3  110.3 
-  15.4  151.4 
-2.1  147.2 
-  27.7  98.3 
-46.7  79.5 
-  57.4  55.5 
-73.7  13.8 
-92.1  1.9 
-  92.7  12.0 
-  104.3  15.7 
-83.8  12.8 
-  112.0  43.6 
-  121.2  16.7 
-  143.8  11.3 
-  143.0  30.3 









-  14.6 
-  14.8 
-  26.2 
-  63.0 
-  76.0 
-  77.7 
-  122.5 
-  166.8 
-  149.2 
-  126.0 
-  126.2 
-  112.9 
-  87.5 
-  93.9 
-  104.8 
-  119.9 
-96.6 
-  155.6 
-  138.0 
-  155.1 
-  121.5 




-  1.1 
-  1.4 
-  2.4 
-  2.7 
-  2.4 
-  1.6 
-  1.6 
-2.0 
-3.1 
-  3.5 
-  3.6 
-5.0 





-  4.2 
-  4.4 
-  4.5 
-4.9 
-4.1 
-  5.4 
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=Net foreign investment in  the  national income accounts summed with the national capital 
grants received by the United States. 
bGross  private domestic savings minus gross private domestic investment, adjusted for statistical 
discrepancy. 
cCombined federal, state, and local government budget deficits. 
dTwenty-year Treasury bond yield less current CPI inflation. 
eFeldstein and Bacchetta (1987). 15  Sources of Misalignment in the  1980s 
real effective exchange rate shows an initial rise of about 13% in 1981, 
a more gradual increase beginning in early  1982, and an acceleration 
in  1984. The standard lags in adjustment of net exports to changes in 
the exchange rate can explain the slow reaction of net exports (net 
foreign borrowing) to the dollar appreciation. 
The data in table 1.2 are consistent with the story of maintenance 
of the flow-of-funds equilibrium in equation (I), with one big exception 
and one major loose end. The exception is that interest rates and ex- 
change rates jumped  in  1981, while the structural deficit only began 
actually to emerge in 1982. Below in section 1.4 I argue that this reflects 
the market’s anticipation of the shift in the budget. The loose end is 
that nothing has been said about what determines the precise mix or 
combination of rise in r and e that achieves short-run equilibrium. For 
this we turn to the financial markets. 
1.2.2 
We  can obtain a relationship between the real interest rate r and the 
real exchange rate e that is imposed by  financial market equilibrium 
by considering the returns that a representative U.S. asset holder ob- 
tains on domestic and foreign assets of the same maturity. The real 
interest rate on domestic assets r is the nominal interest rate i less the 
expected rate of inflation P.  The latter is taken here to be exogenous. 
The real exchange rate e is defined as the nominal rate E times the 




ratio of home price level P to the foreign price level P*:  e= -.  This 
means that changes in the real exchange rate are given by 
(3) 
Now we can define the real return on the domestic asset as r. The 
return, from the U.S. investor’s point of view, on the foreign asset is 
the foreign nominal interest rate less expected depreciation  i* -  E in 
nominal terms, and i’  -  E - P,  or  i*  -  (I?  + p),  in real terms. From 
equation (3), this foreign real return is also given by  i*  -  r;*  -  P, or 
r* - 2,  where r* is the foreign real interest rate. So from the repre- 
sentative U.S. investor’s point of view, the real return on a U.S.  asset 
is r, and on a foreign asset is r* -  P.  In equilibrium,  the difference 
between the two real returns must be equal to the market-determined 
risk  premium  p(B)  on  dollar  assets.  Here  we  assume  that  dollar- 
denominated  bonds  are imperfect  substitutes  for foreign-exchange- 
denominated bonds, so that the risk premium on dollar bonds increases 
with their  supply: p’(B) > 0. The equilibrium condition for rates of 
return in real terms is then 
(4)  r - (r* - 2) = p(B). 
2 = E  + p - p*  . 16  William H. Branson 
Next we need to relate the expected rate of change of the exchange 
rate to the actual current rate.  If  we denote the perceived long-run 
equilibrium real exchange rate that sets the full-employment current 
account balance at zero as P, one reasonable assumption is that the 
current rate is expected to return gradually toward long-run equilib- 
rium.  This assumption can be  written  as a proportional  adjustment 
mechanism: 
(5)  2 = 0(P - e). 
If  e is below the long-run equilibrium, it is expected to rise, and vice 
versa. If we put this expression for e^ into the equilibrium condition (4) 
and rearrange  a bit, we obtain the financial-market equilibrium rela- 




e  = 2  + -(r - r* - p(B)). 
This condition says that for given values of the bond stock B, the 
foreign real interest rate r*, and the long-run equilibrium real exchange 
rate 2,  an increase in r requires an increase in e to maintain equilibrium 
in financial markets. Why? If the U.S. interest rate rises, equilibrium 
can be maintained for a given foreign rate only if the dollar is expected 
to fall. From equation (6), this means that the actual current rate must 
rise to establish 2  < 0. In terms of how the market works, the rise in 
the domestic real rate r causes sales of foreign assets and purchases 
of dollar assets. This in turn raises e until equilibrium is reestablished. 
This is essentially what happened in 1981 with the announcement of a 
path of  future deficits. This did not substantially change the long-run 
e that would balance the current account, but it did move r and e. 
1.2.3  Interest Rates and the Exchange Rate 
We  can now join the flow equilibrium condition, equation (l), and 
the rate-of-return condition, equation (6), to form the short-run frame- 
work for simultaneous determination of r and e. Let us rewrite equation 
(1)  to show the dependence of S and I on r, and of X on e and a shift 
parameter a,  which represents exogenous improvements in  the trade 
balance due to events like a fall in the oil price: 
(7)  G - T = S(r) -  Z(r) -  X(e,  a). 
For a given level of the full-employment budget, the trade-off between 
r and e that maintains flow equilibrium is given by the negatively sloped 
IX curve in figure 1.2.2 For a given G - T, an increase in  r,  which 
increases  (S -  I), requires a reduction in  e, which increases X, to 
maintain flow equilibrium. An increase in G - T or in a  will shift the 17  Sources of  Misalignment in the 1980s 
ZX curve up or to the right, requiring some combination of a rise in r 
and e to maintain flow equilibrium. 
The rate-of-return condition (6) gives us the positively  sloped FM 
curve in figure  1.1, for given B, r*,  and e. Its slope is 8, the speed-of- 
adjustment parameter for expectations. An increase in the risk premium 
p, due to a rise in the supply of  U.S. bonds B, will shift the FM curve 
up and to the left, requiring an increase in r for any given value of  e. 
In the short run, equilibrium rand e are reached at the intersection of 
the ZXand FM curves in figure 1.1 ;  there both equilibrium conditions are 
met. For the purposes of the analysis here, we assume that initially e = 5, 
with no expected movement in exchange rates. This is taken to repre- 
sent the equilibrium around 1980, before the surge in interest rates and 
the exchange rate that I explain using the model of figure 1.1. 
1.2.4  Effects of a Shift in the Budget 
A shift in the structural budget towards deficit shifts the ZX  curve 
up, as shown in figure 1.2. The real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate rise, as described earlier. The composition of these movements is 
determined by the slope of the FM curve, representing financial market 
equilibrium. The movement  of  r  and e from Eo to E, raises excess 
domestic saving (S -  I)  and reduces net exports X  by a sum equal to 
the shift in  G - T.  This also produces  the short-run equilibrium  fi- 
nancing of the shift in the deficit by domestic saving and foreign bor- 
rowing. The results of the shift in G - Tare the movements in excess 
domestic saving and foreign borrowing, and in r and e, that are shown 
in  table  1.2. Thus the framework of  figure 1.2 roughly captures the 
movements of r and e from 1981 to 1985. 
The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation of 1985, if effective, would 
have shifted the ZX curve in  figure 1.2 back down. By eventually re- 
Fig. 1.1  Equilibrium r and e. 18  William H. Branson 
Fig. 1.2 
I  e 
Shift in the structural deficit. 
ducing the structural deficit, it would create room in the high-employment 
economy for an increase in investment and net exports. This would be 
generated by a fall in r and e along the FM line in figure 1.2 as IX shifts 
down. This could explain some of the fall in r and e since mid-1985. 
1.2.5  Extension to Several Countries 
The short-run  model presented  here  can be  extended  easily  to a 
several-country setting. Good examples are the models of  Krugman 
(1985) and McKibbin and Sachs (1986). In their models the effect on 
the exchange rate is dictated by the relative fiscal shift, while the effect 
in the real interest rate depends on world saving versus investment. 
An increase in the U.S.  structural deficit relative to that in Europe or 
Japan would generate appreciation of  the dollar against the ECU or 
the yen. 
The movements in the structural budgets since 1981 are shown in 
table 1.3 for the major OECD countries. The others among the major 
six are Canada, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The numbers 
Table 1.3  Change in Structural Budget Balance (As Percentage of 
Nominal GDP) 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
United States  +0.9  -1.0  -0.8  -0.7  -0.5  -0.2 
Japan  +0.6  +0.4  +0.6  +0.5  +1.0  +0.9 
Germany  +0.1  + 1.4  +1.2  +0.4  +0.5  0.0 
Average of major 
six, excluding U.S.  +0.2  +0.6  +0.3  t0.2  +0.5  +0.4 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, December 1984, June 1985. 19  Sources of  Misalignment in the 1980s 
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Fig. 1.3  Real trade-weighted exchange rate.  Source: Feldstein  and 
Bacchetta (1987). 
in the table give the change in the structural surplus as a percentage 
of  GDP each year. So the table shows the U.S. structural deficit in- 
creasing each year from  1982 to 1986 and the German and Japanese 
structural deficits decreasing each year. The fact that the positive en- 
tries for the average for the major six are smaller than for Germany 
and Japan implies that on average the other four had increasing struc- 
tural deficits. In a sense, the true picture is Japan and Germany tight- 
ening and everyone else easing, led by the United States. 
These fiscal shifts caused the real appreciation of the dollar shown 
in figures 1.3 and 1.4. Figure 1.3 is the effective dollar rate across 80 
countries  calculated by  Feldstein  and  Bacchetta (1987).3 Up is real 
appreciation of the dollar. In effective real terms, in figure 1.3 the dollar 
appreciated by about 55% from late 1980 to mid-1985. Figure 1.4 is the 
real dollar-yen exchange rate, taken from IMF data (ZFS data tape). 
Again up is appreciation of the dollar. There we see the appreciation 
of the dollar by approximately 30% from 1980 to 1985. The movement 
of the real exchange rate makes room in equation (1) for the fiscal shift 
by decreasing X,  making it negative in the U.S. case and increasing it 
in Japan. 
The rapid appreciation of the yen against the dollar since the begin- 
ning of  1985 is in part due to the fall in the oil price.  If we interpret 
for a moment figure  1.2 as representing Japan, a fall in the oil price 
increases X(e, a)  and shifts the ZX curve up.  To  maintain aggregate 20  William H. Branson 
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Fig. 1.4  Real  dollar-yen  exchange rate (up  is  dollar  appreciation). 
Source: IFS data tape. 
demand equal to full-employment output, the real interest rate in Japan 
should rise and the yen should appreciate. 
The extensions to several countries show the importance of relative 
fiscal shifts for movements in the real exchange rate. But the results 
do not contradict the simple one-country model of figure 1.2, as long 
as we remember that it shows the effects of a fiscal shift in the United 
States relative to abroad. So for most of the paper I will stick with the 
simpler single-country version of  the model. 
1.3  Dynamic Adjustment to Long-Run Equilibrium 
In figure 1.2, point Eo is taken to represent the initial equilibrium of 
1980, before the shift in the structural deficit, and point El represents 
the economy in  1984 or 1985, after the full shift in the budget was 
completed. The next question that arises is: is the equilibrium El sus- 
tainable  in  the absence of  further legislation eliminating the deficit? 
The  short  answer  is  no.  This  takes  us  to  the  dynamics  of  debt 
accumulation. 
1.3.1 
At point El in figure 1.2, the economy is running a substantial current 
account deficit, perhaps $150 billion at the end of 1986. This adds, on 
balance, that amount each year to the holdings of dollar-denominated 
assets in international portfolios. Either the United States is borrowing 
Effects of  a Continuing Deficit 21  Sources of Misalignment in the 1980s 
abroad to finance partially the budget deficit, or it is reducing its lending 
as U.S. asset holders shift into government debt. In either case, the 
net foreign position in dollar-denominated assets is growing. This will 
lead eventually to international resistance to the absorption of further 
increases in dollar-denominated  assets and to a rise in U.S. interest 
rates and the exchange rate. 
At any given set of interest rates and exchange rates such as point 
El in figure 1.2, international investors will have some desired distri- 
bution of their portfolio demands across currencies. This will depend, 
of course, on a whole array of expectations as well as current market 
prices. As the U.S. current account deficit adds dollars to these port- 
folios from the supply side, this disturbs the initial portfolio balance, 
shifting the distribution towards dollar assets. In order to induce inves- 
tors to hold the additional dollar assets, either U.S.  interest rates have 
to rise or the dollar must fall, thus offering investors a higher expected 
rate of return on dollars. As the dollar depreciates, the current account 
deficit will shrink. As the deficit shrinks, the rate at which international 
portfolio  distributions are changing is reduced, and so is the rate at 
which the dollar depreciates. Eventually the economy returns to a long- 
run equilibrium where the current account is again balanced, and excess 
domestic saving finances the budget deficit. The dynamics of this ad- 
justment mechanism in a fundamentals model were described in detail 
in Branson (1977); the version with a rational expectations overlay is 
given in Branson (1983). 
This adjustment mechanism has a straightforward interpretation in 
the fundamentals framework of section 1.2. Consider the position of 
the economy at point El,  reproduced in figure 1.5. Remember that &, 
was the initial value of the real exchange rate that produced current 
account  balance. At point  El,  the current account is in  deficit, and 
dollar-denominated debt in international portfolios is increasing. This 
Fig. 1.5  Accumulation of dollar-denominated debt. 22  William H. Branson 
tends to raise the equilibrium U.S.  interest rate r and reduce the ex- 
change rate e. In figure  1.5 this is captured by  a continuing upward 
drift in  the FM curve. In equation (5) for rate-of-return equilibrium, 
the bond stock B is growing. This raises the risk premium, shifting FM 
up.4 As FM shifts up, driven by the current account deficit, the interest 
rate rises and the exchange rate falls along ZX.  This movement contin- 
ues until the current balance is again roughly zero, at point E2  in figure 
1.5. There the real interest rate has risen enough that S -  Z  = G -  Tat 
high employment. 
If  most of  the increase in S -  I  has come from a reduction in in- 
vestment, the E2  equilibrium will have a significantly lower growth path 
than the original Eo equilibrium. Through the shift in  the budget, the 
economy will  have traded an increase in consumption (including de- 
fense) for a reduction in investment. The point E2 in figure 1.5 has an 
exchange rate  below  Po,  suggesting that  in  the new equilibrium the 
dollar will  have depreciated  in  real terms relative to its initial  1980 
position.  Why? In the transition from El to E,,  the United  States is 
running a substantial current account deficit. This will reduce the US. 
international investment position.  In fact, it is shifting this position 
from net creditor to net debtor. The consequence of this shift in the 
international credit position of the United States is a reduction in the 
investment income item in the current account. The former positive 
flow of investment income has become a negative flow of debt service. 
At the original Eo equilibrium, with a surplus on investment income 
and the service account, the current account balanced  with a trade 
deficit. The deficit on trade in goods offset the surplus in services. But 
at the new E2 equilibrium, the service account will be in deficit, re- 
quiring a trade surplus to produce current account balance. The real 
exchange rate at E2 will have to be lower than at Eo to produce the 
required shift in the trade balance from deficit to surplus. It should be 
clear that the result does not depend on the investment income account 
actually becoming negative. A series of  current account deficits that 
reduce the investment income surplus would lead to a new equilibrium 
with a smaller trade deficit and therefore a higher value for e. This 
consequence of the dynamic adjustment through current account im- 
balance was discussed in Branson (1977). 
1.3.2  Closing the Deficit: Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
How do we fit the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) legislation that 
would, if  effective, close the deficit by 1992 into the dynamic model? 
To  see the answer, let us assume that GRH takes the ZX  curve back 
to its original ZoXo position of figure 1.2, running through the original 
equilibrium Eo. Will the economy then go back to that initial equilib- 
rium? The answer is no. The accumulation of U.S. government debt 
and the shift in the U.S. international position from lender to borrower 23  Sources of Misalignment in the 1980s 
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has shifted the FM curve up, so the economy cannot  return to the 
original equilibrium. 
This result is shown in figure 1.6. The IX curve is back at its original 
&Xo position of figure 1.2, but the debt accumulation has increased the 
risk premium p(B) in equation (9,  shifting the FM curve up to F,  MI. 
So the new equilibrium with the budget deficit finally eliminated is at 
E,,  with a higher real interest rate and lower value for the dollar than 
at Eo.  The higher real interest rate is due to the increased risk premium, 
and the lower value of the dollar is needed to produce the trade surplus 
needed to pay for U.S. debt service. 
The reversal of the movement of the dollar that began in spring 1985 
reflects a mixture of  portfolio  resistance, represented  by  movement 
from El toward E2  in figures 1.5 and 1.6, supplemented by GRH, which 
would push the equilibrium toward E,. The dollar peaked in early 1985 
and has fallen by about 25% in real terms since then (up to December 
1986). Real interest rates have remained around 5%, which could be 
represented by a movement from E, to E3 in figure 1.6. In addition, 
the mix of financing of the current account deficit has shifted from U.S. 
foreign borrowing towards a reduction in  U.S. bank lending abroad. 
This may  signal the rise in  foreign  resistance  to further lending  in 
dollars. So there is some evidence that the movement from equilibrium 
El toward E2 began  in  1985, and  that  passage  of  GRH moved  the 
equilibrium along to an eventual E,. The long-run equilibrium with a 
shift in the U.S. international position from lender to borrower will 
require that the real interest rate in the United States be higher and 
the real value of the dollar lower than in the original equilibrium of 
1980. This is the comparison of E3 to Eo in figure 1.6. 
1.4  Expectations and Timing 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3 of this paper presented the fundamentals frame- 
work for analyzing the determinants of movements in real interest rates 24  William H. Branson 
and the exchange rate, both in a short run with asset stocks fixed and 
in a longer run in which the budget and the current account gradually 
change the country’s international investment position. This  framework 
suggests that agents in financial markets should form expectations about 
the exogenous variables that move the ZX  and FM curves-the  flow 
and stock equilibrium loci-in  order to anticipate movements in real 
interest rates and the exchange rate. The timing of the jump in these 
variables in  1981 and again in 1985 suggests that this is indeed the case. 
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 had one particular aspect 
that is unusually useful for macroeconomic analysis. It provided  an 
example of  a clear-cut  and  credible  announcement of future policy 
actions at specified dates. A three-stage tax cut was announced in the 
Tax Act in March 1981. Simultaneously, a multistage buildup in defense 
spending was announced. This implied a program of future structural 
deficits, beginning late in  1982. The fundamentals framework tells us 
that this would begin a process which starts with the ZX  curve shifting 
up, to El in figures 1.2 and 1.5 causing a rise in real interest rates and 
appreciation of the dollar.  It then continues with a  current account 
deficit, a further rise in interest rates, and a real depreciation of the 
dollar toward a new long-run equilibrium E2. If the budget deficit is 
eventually closed, the equilibrium would move further to E3 in figure 
1.6. The initial movement to E,  is more certain than the eventual con- 
vergence to E2 or E3.  If the tax changes were enacted when they were 
announced, British  style, we would  expect to see the jump in  real 
interest  rates and the exchange rate come on the heels  of  the tax 
changes. 
But in the US.  case, the 1981  announcement implied a forecast of 
a growing high-employment deficit beginning in 1982. During the period 
from March to June of 1981, projections of the likely structural deficit 
emerged from sources such as  Data Resources, Inc., and Chase Econo- 
metrics and circulated through Washington and the financial commu- 
nity. This meant that the financial markets could look ahead to the shift 
in the budget (and the ZX curve) and anticipate its implications for bond 
prices and interest rates. 
The expected emergence of a persistent structural deficit provided 
a prediction that real long-term interest rates would rise (moving from 
Eo to El in figure 1.2), and bond prices fall. Once that expectation took 
hold in the market, the usual dynamics of asset prices tells us that long 
rates should rise immediately, in anticipation of the future shift in the 
budget. Indeed, in the early fall of 1981 the long rate moved above the 
short rate, and has remained  there since, through recession and re- 
covery. This is consistent with the bond market anticipating the move- 
ment not only to  El  as  the budget shifts but also toward E2  as  the effects 25  Sources of  Misalignment in the 1980s 
121  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1979  1981  1983  1985  1987 
YEAR 
Fig. 1.7  Real  long-term bond rate. 20-year Treasury bond less CPI 
inflation. 
of debt accumulation  are felt. In  1981, legislation closing the deficit 
was over the horizon. 
The markets could also anticipate an appreciation of the dollar, that 
is, the rise in e from Eo to El in figures 1.2 and 1.5, as the structural 
deficit emerged. This expectation could have been  derived from na- 
tional  income  reasoning or from thinking about capital movements. 
One could ask the series of questions: (1) What will have to be crowded 
out to make room for the deficit? Answer: investment and net exports. 
(2) How will net exports get crowded out? Answer: dollar appreciation. 
Or one could reason that the rise in interest rates would attract financing 
from abroad, leading to appreciation of the dollar. Section 1.2 showed 
that these are two views of  the same adjustment mechanism. Either 
says that the dollar would appreciate. Once that expectation takes hold, 
the dollar should be expected to jump immediately. 
Indeed, the steepest appreciation of  the dollar came across  1981, 
well before the emergence of the structural deficit. The deficit data are 
summarized in table  1.4, taken from the  1984 Council of  Economic 
Advisers Annual Report. Real interest rates and the dollar show their 
major movements across 1981; the structural deficit begins to appear 
in  1982. This is consistent with the view that the markets anticipated 
the shift in the budget position when they understood the implications 
of  the program that was announced in  1981. The anticipation of the 
shift in the budget by real interest rates and the real exchange rate in 26  William H. Branson 
Table 1.4  Cyclical and Structural Components of the Federal Budget Deficit, 
Fiscal Years 1980-1989 










Estimates (current services): 
1984  187 
1985  208 
1986  216 
1987  220 
1988  203 





















Sources:  Budget of  the  United  States Government  Fiscal  Year  1985  and Council  of 
Economic Advisers. 
1981 provide an important example of the effect of credible announce- 
ments and expectations in financial markets. 
The implied reversal of  the path of  the real exchange rate as the 
fundamentals model  moves  from  Eo to El to E2 or E, also has  its 
influence through expectations. If-as  the dollar appreciates from E,, 
toward El in figures 1.2 and 1.5-agents  in the market believe that the 
movement will eventually be reversed towards E2  or  E,, this anticipated 
depreciation of the dollar will temper their increase in demand for dollar 
assets as real interest rates in the United States rise. This would tend 
to reduce the magnitude of  the appreciation from Eo to E, and the 
subsequent depreciation to E2 or E3.  The dampening of price fluctua- 
tions is a general property of rational expectations analysis (it used to 
be called “stabilizing speculation”).  An example is given in Branson 
(1983). 
The upward jump in the exchange rate from Eo to El and gradual 
movement  back  toward E2 are also consistent  with  market  agents’ 
anticipating the shift in the U.S. international position from creditor 
to debtor. This is implied by a sufficiently long period of current account 
deficits to finance the budget deficit. This in turn  requires an initial 
appreciation of the dollar. But eventually the dollar must fall again, to 
a point  somewhat below its original position. In anticipation of this 
swing, the market would generate an initial jump smaller than the one 
from Eo to El,  smoothing the path somewhat. Thus, expectations of 
the implications of, first, the shift in the budget position, and, second, 
the implied switch of the United States from international creditor to 27  Sources of  Misalignment in the 1980s 
debtor would generate the movements in  real  interest  rates and the 
exchange rate that we saw from 1980 to 1985. In particular, anticipation 
of the budget shift based on the March  1981 program can account for 
the movements on rates that came before the actual emergence of the 
structural deficit. Finally, it should be noted that anticipations of re- 
versals as the path of asset market prices (generally known as “over- 
shooting’’) reduce the magnitude of their fluctuations. It is shifts in the 
fundamentals that cause the fluctuations; in general, expectations can 
be expected to stabilize. 
1.5  Econometric Evidence 
The size and timing of the movements in the structural deficit and 
the real exchange rate in the first half of the 1980s strongly support the 
view that the shift in the expected deficit moved the exchange rate. 
Here I summarize some econometric evidence that corroborates this 
view. Rudiger Dornbusch and Jeffrey Frankel (1987) present an esti- 
mate of the sensitivity of the current account balance to a change in 
the real effective exchange rate. We  can use that to check the consis- 
tency  between  the  size of  the shift in  the current  account and the 
structural deficit and the exchange rate from tables 1.2 and 1.4 above. 
Martin Feldstein (1986) studies the effect of shifts in the expected U.S. 
deficit on the deutsche-mark-dollar real exchange rate. His results are 
summarized below. John Campbell and Richard Clarida (1987) present 
time-series econometrics of  exchange rates and interest differentials 
that  suggest that the market’s view of  the long-run equilibrium real 
exchange rate was changing. This would be the case if the original shift 
in the budget was unanticipated and expected to be permanent, and 
likewise with GRH. 
First, in table 1.2 we saw the increase in the total budget deficit from 
near zero in early 1981 to around $150 billion in 1985, with the federal 
deficit growing from 1.6% of GNP to a little over 5%.  In table 1.4 we 
see the estimated  structural federal deficit growing from  about  $40 
billion  in  1981 to $200 billion  by  1989. These numbers  point  to an 
estimated increase in the expected structural federal budget deficit of 
around $150 billion, beginning in  1981. 
This increase must be split between a reduction in the current account 
balance, identified as net foreign investment in table  1.2, and excess 
domestic savings, S -  Z in equation (1) above, also shown in table 1.2. 
The burden of financing the deficit will shift from domestic sources in 
the short run to foreign borrowing in the medium run. This is a standard 
conclusion from Mundell in the 1960s. This implies a movement toward 
a trade deficit of $125-150  billion, building up from 1981 to 1985. Thus 
the current account balance fell from near zero in  1981 to around a 28  William H. Branson 
$150 billion deficit in 1985, providing the major share of finance for the 
structural deficit by then. 
What about the real exchange rate? The index in table 1.2 rises from 
around 65 in  1980 to 100 in the first half of  1985, an increase of a bit 
over 50%. We  compare  1981-85  on the current account balance to 
1980-84 for the exchange rate to allow for lags in adjustment of trade 
flows behind the exchange rate. Using these data, it appears that a 50% 
appreciation was needed  to generate a $1 50 billion  reduction in  the 
current account balance, about 4%  of GNP. The ratio of  these two 
numbers gives us an apparent  semielasticity  of the current account 
balance with respect to the real exchange rate of about 3-a  1% ap- 
preciation  yields a $3 billion deterioration in the balance on current 
account. 
This semielasticity is the current conventional wisdom number as 
reported by Stephen Marris (1985), and it is supported by the econo- 
metrics of Dornbusch and Frankel. Their regression shows that a 13.5% 
real appreciation will reduce the trade balance by 1% of GNP, so a 4% 
reduction would require a 54% appreciation. So if we ask the question: 
how big an exchange-rate change would be needed to generate the shift 
in the current account that we have observed? we get plausible econo- 
metric results. 
The timing of  the exchange-rate movement  has already been  dis- 
cussed. The movement began sharply across 1981, as the expected full- 
employment deficit shifted. This takes us to Feldstein’s study. He reports 
econometric equations that  show directly the effects of  a measured 
shift in the expected structural deficit on the real deutsche-mark-dollar 
exchange rate. So Feldstein turns the question around to ask how big 
the  effect of  the  shift is  on the deficit on the  exchange rate,  uses 
measures of the expected deficit, and focuses on the bilateral deutsche- 
mark-dollar rate. 
I  summarize Feldstein’s results in table 1.5. Let me describe more 
precisely the econometrics. The dependent variable in the regressions 
is the deutsche-mark (DM) price of the dollar, adjusted for the ratio of 
GNP deflators and indexed to 1980 = 1  .O.  The independent variables 
in the equation shown in table  1.5 are the following. DEFEX is the 
ratio of the expected Federal structural deficit to GNP over the next 
five years. Here estimates of the actual deficit are used up to 1984, and 
projections are used after that. This implies that the shift in the budget 
after 1981 began to enter expectations in  1977. The expected deficit 
series begins to rise then. This underestimates  the sharpness of  the 
change in 1981. 
The variable MBGRO is the ex post annual rate of change of  the 
U.S. monetary base, which I  take to be a predictor of the change in 
the future level of  the US.  money stock relative to that abroad. An 29  Sources of  Misalignment in the 1980s 







in  1984 
~~~~~~~  ~~ 
DEFEX  0.343  0.67 
MBGRO  -0.067  0.32 
PDLINF  -0.094  - 
DUM80 +  -0.174  - 
rT2  0.87  - 
D- W  1.72 
Source: Feldstein (1986). table 2, equation 2.6. 






increase in  this variable  should cause the dollar to depreciate. The 
variable PDLINF is a polynomial-distributed log on past rates of in- 
flation on the GNP deflator, taken as a predictor of future inflation. An 
increase in this variable should also produce a depreciation. The vari- 
able DUM80+  is a  dummy  variable, unity  from  1980  on and zero 
before, to capture other effects after 1980. 
Feldstein  reports many variants of  the regression of table  1.5. In 
particular, he adds the German expected deficit and money growth and 
finds them insignificant. He adds a variable measuring the effects of 
changes in the tax laws on the after-tax rate of return, and it takes on 
the wrong sign. This leaves the DUM80 + variable as a rough measure 
of  safe-haven effects. 
In table  1.5 I  show the coefficients and standard errors of  the in- 
dependent variables, with end-of-period elasticities for the expected 
deficit and money growth. The coefficient for the expected deficit is 
positive and highly significant. In Feldstein’s data, which he shows in 
his appendix table A. 1, the expected structural deficit as a fraction of 
GNP approximately doubled from 1.6% in  1978 to 3.3% in  1984. I use 
a base of 1978 to allow for the gradual way he introduces the expected 
deficit. The exchange-rate index rose by  70% from 1980 to 1984 (re- 
member this is the DM-dollar rate, not the effective dollar rate of table 
1.2). With an elasticity of  0.67, a  100% increase in the deficit would 
by Feldstein’s estimate account for nearly all of  the actual rise in the 
dollar. This is consistent with the Dornbusch-Frankel evidence cited 
earlier. 
The coefficient of  money growth is negative as expected, but not 
significant. Its significance varies across Feldstein’s equations, but it 30  William H. Branson 
is consistently negative. The inflation coefficient is negative, also as 
expected, and the safe-haven variable is quite insignificant. 
Feldstein’s econometrics on the DM-dollar rate thus fully supports 
the basic argument of this paper. The shift in the structural deficit was 
responsible for most of the rise in the real value of the dollar over the 
period  1980-85,  and the timing is consistent with the shift in the ex- 
pected deficit moving the actual real exchange rate. 
Notes 
1. Here for simplicity I ignore changes in the term structure of interest rates 
and focus on the real rate. See Branson, Fraga, and Johnson (1986) for the 
analysis of relative movements of short and long rates consistent with the story 
being told here. 
2. The slope is given by X<,/(Z’ - S‘). 
3. The Feldstein-Bacchetta index uses multilateral trade weights and relative 
Consumer Price  Indexes for the 80 countries for which  data are available. 
These represent 89% of  non-soviet, non-U.S. trade. 
4. The vertical measure of  the shift is just p’(B). 
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Comment  Maurice Obstfeld 
William  Branson has  advanced  an  explanation of  the  U.S. dollar’s 
recent behavior that centers on fiscal policy and the associated federal 
budget deficits. Prospective and actual American fiscal expansion pulled 
the dollar up starting in  1981, Branson argues; prospective and actual 
fiscal contraction, possibly reinforced by an increasing foreign reluc- 
tance to accumulate dollar claims, has pushed the dollar down since 
1985. To  make his case, Branson sets out a partial-equilibrium model 
of  the “real”  U.S. economy and demonstrates the model’s ability to 
mimic the dollar’s behavior when perturbed by fiscal policies similar 
to those enacted under the Reagan administration. By implication, the 
paper  also explains U.S. real  interest  rates  largely in  terms of  the 
government budget. 
The paper’s model is squarely in the tradition of the dynamic Mundell- 
Fleming approach, of  which  Branson  was  a pioneer.  An  increased 
government budget deficit is assumed to raise the demand for national 
savings; equilibrium is restored by a rise in the real interest rate (which 
encourages saving and reduces the flow supply of capital assets) and 
a real currency appreciation (which reduces the current account sur- 
plus-the  flow of national saving into foreign assets). Alternatively, and 
I think more usefully, this mechanism can be viewed as maintaining 
equilibrium in the domestic output market. An  increase in the fiscal 
deficit creates excess demand for home output, but  the higher real 
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interest rate shifts private demand to the future and the real currency 
appreciation shifts it abroad. 
Like Branson, I believe that fiscal policy is of central importance in 
explaining the dollar’s fluctuations in the 1980s; for that reason, I made 
a two-country version of the Mundell-Fleming model the centerpiece 
of my own 1985 review of recent exchange rate experience. Nonethe- 
less, Branson’s diagnosis of U.S. macroeconomic experience and pros- 
pects seems incomplete to me for two reasons. 
First, Branson’s contention that fiscal policy alone can explain most 
foreign exchange developments is  not backed  up by  any persuasive 
empirical evidence. No serious attempt is made to assess the effects 
of other factors, notably monetary policy, on real exchange rates and 
interest rates.  Calculations  reported in  my  1985 paper indicate that 
shifts in OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- 
opment) fiscal positions cannot account completely for the dollar’s real 
appreciation between 1980 and 1985. 
Second, the model Branson employs  is  ill-equipped to illuminate 
convincingly the longer-term effects of public budgetary policies in a 
growing world economy. In particular, the model treats only vaguely 
the intertemporal links that restrict the joint evolution of government 
debts, cross-border debts, outside asset supplies, and expectations. 
Both  of  these difficulties are easier to raise  than to resolve.  The 
following comments therefore review some relevant facts and models 
with the aim of placing Branson’s analysis in a broader perspective. 
Monetary Policy, Interest Rates, and Exchange Rates 
In a  1986 paper written  with Arminio Fraga and Robert Johnson, 
Branson suggested that tighter U.S. monetary policy after 1979 con- 
tributed to the dollar’s appreciation and to the recession that began in 
1981. A reader of the present paper, however, comes away with the 
impression that a monocausal theory is being espoused. A review of 
the data shows that monetary policy must be included in any expla- 
nation of OECD exchange-rate and interest-rate behavior in the 1980s. 
Table 1.6 shows recent nominal money supply growth rates for the 
United States, Germany, and Japan; table 1.7 shows corresponding real 
monetary growth rates.’ In late 1979 in the United States and Germany, 
1. The choice of  MI growth  as the key  indicator  of  monetary  ease is  of 
course open to debate; broader monetary aggregates such as M2 tell a different 
story.  My defense  is the usual  one, that MI  seems to be the best  available 
approximation to the notion of liquid balances.  An additional problem relates 
to shifts in money demand, particularly those associated with financial dereg- 
ulation. In spite of these drawbacks of the MI indicator, I believe it still offers 
a rough picture of the stance of monetary policy. Figures on regulation-adjusted 
M1 generally confirm the story told by the tables; see Obstfeld (1985). 33  Sources of Misalignment in the 1980s 
Table 1.6  Monetary Growth Rates in the Big Three Industrialized Countries, 
1978-86  (Percentage per Year) 
Country  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
U.S.  8.2  7.5  7.5  5.1  8.7  10.4  5.3  11.9  16.7 
Germany  14.2  3.7  4.2  -0.8  6.6  8.1  5.9  5.3  8.2 
Japan  13.4  3.0  -2.0  10.0  5.7  -0.1  6.9  4.5  10.4 
Note: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic  Outlook, April  1986 
(table 25), and lnternational Financial  Statistics, April  1987. Figures are percentage 
increases  in  the end-of-year  money  stock  MI  over the  corresponding value for the 
previous year. 
Table 1.7  Real Monetary Growth Rates in the Big Three Industrialized 
Countries, 1978-86  (Percentage per Year) 
~~~ 
Country  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
U.S.  0.9  -  1.3  -1.6  -4.5  2.2  6.6  1.4  8.6  14.1 
Germany  9.9  -0.3  -0.6  -4.8  2.2  4.9  4.0  3.1  4.9 
Japan  8.6  0.0  -5.8  6.8  3.8  -0.9  5.6  3.1  8.6 
Note: M1 growth rate (from table 1.6) minus annual percentage change in GDP deflator, 
from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, April 1986 and April 1987. 
and in early 1980 in Japan, short- and long-term nominal interest rates 
rose, and short-term rates jumped far above long-term rates as mon- 
etary growth slowed. According to the expectations theory of the term 
structure, this  pattern  is  consistent  with  a liquidity  squeeze that is 
expected to lead to lower inflation and lower nominal short-term rates 
in the future. Because inflation expectations cannot be measured with 
precision, the relation between these nominal interest rate changes and 
contemporaneous real interest rate changes is difficult to assess.2 
Branson identifies the first half of  1981  as the period in which ex- 
pected U.S. fiscal expansion set off the rise in U.S. real interest rates. 
Tables  1.6 and  1.7 show, however, that U.S. and German monetary 
growth dropped sharply in that year; at the same time, real interest 
rates at all maturities (as defined by Branson) rose in both countries, 
2. The nominal interest-rate plots on which my account is based are in the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook, April 1985, pp. 126- 
27. Branson defines short- and long-term real interest rates alike as nominal 
rates minus current CPI inflation; on this definition, the differences between 
the short and long nominal rates shown in the IMF plots are also differences 
between short and long real  rates.  It is  unlikely,  however, that  Branson’s 
definition of real interest rates is  appropriate, particularly  in the case of the 
long rate. Surely market participants used more information than the current 
inflation  rate in forecasting inflation over the following 20 years. 34  William H. Branson 
with short rates rising most sharply and remaining above long rates for 
most  of the year. By  comparison, the long-term real  rate rose only 
moderately in Japan (and the short-term real rate showed little change) 
in the face of that country’s easy 1981 monetary stance. 
A good case can thus be made that monetary factors were an im- 
portant cause of the global interest rate developments of 1981 (a con- 
clusion also reached by  Blanchard and Summers 1984). In addition, 
other events reinforced American fiscal plans and tight money in push- 
ing up interest rates. Between 1981 and 1982, for example, the OPEC 
surplus disappeared, reducing the flow of saving in the world economy. 
Shifts in term-structure slopes in the early 1980s are also consistent 
with a monetary interpretation. Late in 1982, short-term interest rates 
fell decisively below long-term rates in the United States and Germany 
as their central banks became more expansionary. (This change had 
occurred in Japan the year before.) Under the expectations theory, this 
term-structure pattern is consistent with short-term rates that are tem- 
porarily low because of monetary ease and recession; an explanation 
does not have to rely on fiscal policy. 
Even if  monetary factors are key to explaining interest rate move- 
ments in the early 1980s, their relevance for exchange rates is less clear 
from the data. In evaluating the evidence, however, it should be re- 
membered that 1978 was a year of crisis for the dollar: markets expected 
runaway U.S. money growth and massive future depreciation. These 
expectations led Germany and Japan to expand their money supplies 
rapidly in  1978 to support the dollar in the foreign exchange market. 
While the Federal Reserve’s October 1979 shift in operating procedures 
had a small immediate impact on U.S. nominal monetary growth, the 
accompanying shift in market expectations about future money growth 
was probably significant. The expectation of a monetary regime change 
was reinforced by the election of an apparently anti-inflation U.S. pres- 
ident in November 1980. 
The role of money in promoting the dollar’s decline since early 1985 
seems quite clear-cut. Branson again attributes the change largely to 
American fiscal legislation, this time restrictive. While some fiscal tight- 
ening has occurred and is likely to continue, the magnitudes involved 
are too small to explain plausibly the dollar’s sharp descent from its 
peak. In contrast, a glance at tables 1.6 and 1.7 shows that U.S. mon- 
etary policy was extraordinarily loose in 1985 and 1986. (As in the late 
1970s, Germany and Japan became less restrictive in 1986 to slow down 
the dollar’s depreciation.) Without a rapid correction of the U.S.  budget 
problem, growing inflation will eventually erode the recent increase in 
American competitiveness. One possibility that must worry the foreign 
exchange market is that U.S. policymakers will mistakenly saddle mon- 
etary policy alone with the assignment of eliminating the current ac- 
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Fiscal Deficits in the Long Run: An Analytical Framework 
Branson's model offers a long-run analysis of fiscal deficits and the 
exchange rate, but it does not explicitly incorporate the essential in- 
tertemporal objectives and constraints that determine the evolution of 
asset stocks over time. In a  1987 paper, I develop a more complete 
framework geared to analyzing the medium- and long-term effects of 
budget deficits in a growing world economy. A modified small-country 
version of that model addresses many of the issues raised by Bran~on.~ 
The economy's labor force grows at rate p and produces a homo- 
geneous domestic output using a Ricardian technology with labor pro- 
ductivity parameter  m.  Households in  this economy can own foreign 
or domestic bonds, both of which are denominated in the export good, 
are perfect substitutes, and pay an interest rate r determined e~ternally.~ 
The feature of the model that gives public debt policy its real effects 
comes from an insightful paper by  Weil  (1985).  Every  household  is 
immortal, but newly born households are not  connected  to existing 
ones by ties of altruism and are born without financial wealth. Thus, 
a  household  born  at  time  v I  t  maximizes  J;  {alog[cx(v,s)] 
+ (1 - a)log[cm(v,s)]}  e-s(s-t)ds,  where  cx(v,t) and  cm(v,t) are  the 
household's  own consumption of exports and imports, respectively. 
Household size and labor endowment are normalized  to  1, as is the 
total labor force at time t = 0. Iff(t) is the economy's per capita stock 
of net foreign claims and d(t)  its per capita stock of domestic govern- 
ment debt (both measured in exports), then the export value of aggre- 
gate per capita spending on  the two goods, c(t), is given by  c(t) = 
8[f(t)  + d(t) + m/r + J;~(s)e-~("-')ds],  where T(t) denotes time-t per 
capita transfer payments from the government.  Let e(t) be the real 
exchange rate, the price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods. 
Per capita demand for the exported good is ac(t),  while per capita 
demand for imports is (1 -  a)e(t)c(t). 
The rest  of  the  world  also grows at rate  p. Foreign  demand  for 
domestic output is x"[e(t)] (per domestic household), a decreasing func- 
tion of e(t). The home output market therefore  clears when  supply 
equals demand, 
(1)  a&)  + x*[e(t)] + g(t) = w. 
Above, g(t)  is the home government's per capita consumption (devoted 
entirely to home goods). 
The dynamics of the economy are described by the two differential 
equations 
3. Alternative and complementary  analyses of long-run fiscal policy effects 
in stationary economies are given by Frenkel and Razin (1986), Buiter (1986), 
and Giovannini (forthcoming). 
4. The model assumes that r > b,  so that the economy is dynamically efficient. 36  William H. Branson 
k(t) = (r - a)&)  - pa[f(r) + &)I, 
.i(O  = (r - k.lf(t) + w -  41) -  1. 
Under the assumption of saddlepath stability, the equilibrium average 
consumption level is 
(2)  c(r) = 8{f(t)  + O/Y  + J:[pd(s)  - g(s)le-r(”-‘)ds}. 
A key feature of this solution is that consumption responds positively 
to current and future increases in the per capita government debt when 
p > 0. As emphasized by Weil(1985),  government bonds are net wealth 
in  this  model, because  some of the taxes that  service them will  be 
levied on other households that have not yet been born. 
Equations (1) and (2) support an important element of the Branson 
thesis: a rise in expected future deficits, which raises expected future 
per capita debt levels, leads to an immediate jump in consumption. To 
eliminate the resulting excess demand for domestic output, e(t)  must 
therefore rise and crowd out foreign demand. The transmission mech- 
anism is, however,  quite different from the one Branson postulates. 
Anticipated fiscal policy has a direct impact on consumption and thus 
on the output market. Equilibrium in that market is restored  by  the 
exchange rate change. 
The model’s long-run implications for consumption and foreign claims 
are straightforward  and are illustrated in  figures 1.8 and  1.9 for the 
model’s two possible configurations. In either case, a permanent un- 
anticipated increase in  the steady-state per capita public debt causes 
consumption to jump immediately from its initial equilibrium at point 
A to point B on the new saddlepath. Consumption and foreign assets 
both fall in  the subsequent transition to the new steady state at point 
A’.  As the figures show, a permanent increase in the steady-state public 
debt always leads to a long-run fall in  both consumption and foreign 
assets per capita. According to (l), the consumption decline is asso- 
ciated with a lower steady-state real exchange rate-yet  another case 
of the transfer problem5 
These results are broadly in line with Branson’s predictions, but the 
inclusion of  economic growth  makes it  clear that  only permanently 
higher budget deficits-such  as those associated with increases in the 
steady-state public debt-will  have permanent effects on the economy. 
5. This result is similar to one found by Branson, but again the mechanism 
is different. Branson relies on the hypothesis that an increasing risk premium 
must be offered to foreign investors as their holdings of dollar debt rise. In my 
model, a long-run real depreciation is necessary to preserve domestic goods- 
market equilibrium after a transfer of  wealth  abroad  (given a standard as- 
sumption that foreigners have the greater marginal propensity to  spend on their 
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Fig. 1.8 
(r(6)  f 
Effects of an increased per capita public debt when the do- 
mestic time-preference rate exceeds the world interest rate. 
Fig. 1.9 
(r)B)  f 
Effects of an increased per capita public debt when the world 
interest rate exceeds the domestic time-preference rate. 
Notice also that the economy does not return to its original current 
account position after a rise in the steady-state public debt. Only a 
lower long-run current account surplus is consistent with a lower long- 
run  per capita foreign-asset  level. Perhaps surprisingly, the long-run 
current account surplus is lower in spite of the fall in the relative price 
of  domestic goods. 
Conclusion 
An explicitly intertemporal analysis of  a model based on Mundell- 
Fleming assumptions confirms some central results of Branson’s less 
formal treatment. In the short run, expected as well as current increases 
in the government deficit raise the real exchange rate and worsen the 
current account. Fiscal  policies that cause the national  debt to rise 38  William H. Branson 
permanently relative to GNP depress both “outside”  national wealth 
and the real exchange rate in the long run. 
While these results are consistent with the view that fiscal policy has 
been central in determining the dollar’s external value in the  1980s, 
factors other than fiscal policy appear to have had significant effects. 
The most important of these factors is monetary policy. U.S. monetary 
policy since 1985 has tried to reduce the severity of  the international 
trade problem by forcing the dollar down. In spite of the dollar’s sharp 
depreciation, little progress has been made in restoring external balance 
or defeating the protectionist threat. Unless expenditure-reducing pol- 
icies are brought into play more quickly, part of the gain in U.S. com- 
petitiveness since 1985 is likely to be dissipated by higher inflation. 
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